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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

---------------- ------------------------STATE OF UTAH in the
interest of
JACKSON, Rose Marie
(01-16-68):
JACKSON, Harold Pratt (11-11-72):
JACKSON, Dollie Ann
(07-31-74):

Case no. 15386

Persons under eighteen years
of age

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the termination of the parental
rights of Marvin and Ruby Jackson as to Rose, Harold, and
Dollie Jackson, and the provision for continuing contact
between Rose and her natural parents subsequent to such
termination.

Parental rights as to a fourth child, Carol,

were also at issue in the trial court, but are not an
issue in this appeal as said rights were not terminated
by the juvenile court.

Termination was sought pursuant

to Section 78-3a-48, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended),
for the reason that the parents are unfit or incompetent
by reason of conduct, or condition which is seriously
detrimental to the children.
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DISPOSI'riO'J IN T!IS JUVENILE COURT
The Second District Juvenile Court, the Honorable
Judith \vhi tmer presiding, after a trial before said Court,
entered an order placing the child Carol in foster care
and denying the petition for permanent deprivation.

The

court ordered the termination of parental rights with
regard to Rose, Harold, and Dollie Jackson, but provided
in the case of Rose for limited contact with her natural
parents should she desire it.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent State of Utah asks that the order
of the Juvenile Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent disagrees and takes exception to
the Statement of Fact made by Appellants in the foll01-1ing
particulars.
l.

Appellant states on page 2 in paragraph 2

of their Brief that counsel for the parents

(Appellants)

objected to psychological examinations of themselves at
a hearing on March 8, 1977.

In fact Appellants were not

represented by counsel on March 8 and no objection as to
said proposed psychologicals was made on their behalf
at said hearing.

(R. pg. 3).
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2.

Appellants state on page 2 in paragraph 3

of their Brief that at a hearing held on March 17, 1977,
the parents (Appellants) objected to the State's motion
for psychologicals except as to the completion of
?sychologicals allready commenced by Dr. Tomb.

In fact

parents counsel did not object to said nsychologicals,
but only requested that she be given opportunity to have
some input as to the naming of the psychologist should
Dr. Tomb not complete his existing evaluations.

(Record

at page 11, lines 9-13).
3.

Appellants' Statement of Facts is inadequate

in that it speaks only of the procedures followed in the
juvenile court and does not relate sufficient collateral
information concerning the family circumstances to afford
a complete understanding of the case in the context of
terminating parental rights.

For this reason respondent

State of Utah accepts and adopts the Statement of Facts
set forth in the Brief filed by the Guardian Ad Litem.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE DECISIO:'J
OF THE JUVENILE COURT TO ORDER THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS \'liTH REGARL> TO
ROSE, HAROLD, AND DOLLIE JACKSON.
A statutory test for termination of parental
rights is

CJ

finding "that the parent or parents are unfit
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or

incompet~nt

by reason of conduct or condition senously
·

detrimental to the child ... "
1953, as amended.)
evidence."

(Section 78-3a-48 (1) (a), U.C.,l

Proof must be by a "preponderance of

(State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P.2d 395

(1970)).
In the present case the Juvenile Court found:
(1)

That the natural parents are socially

and emotionally retarded and unable or unwilling to
stimulate their children psychologically, emotionally,
or socially, and as a result the children, to their serious
detriment, are failing to develop properly and are
exhibiting serious mental disorders.
(2)

That Mr. Jackson has a serious

personali~

disturbance that renders him unable to cope with the
of everyday living.

proble~

Further, that tests and reports of

past behavior indicated that he is subject to virtually
uncontrollable aggressive impulses threatening the childrer
physical welfare.
(3)

That Mrs. Jackson, a deaf-mute, functions

on a child-like level and is minimally able to make a
marginal life adjustment.

She is completely lacking in

parenting skills and is unable to relate to her children
except as a playmate.
(4)

That HarLl~ ~nd Dollie progressed dcve~p-

mentally only when they were removed from the hoPle of the:.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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natural parents and given treatment at the Children's
Center.
(5)

That Rose and Carol, though entitled to some

limited contact with their natural parents, could not
receive

proper training at home.
Testimony indicated that the Division of Family

Services had made efforts to teach Mr. and Mrs. Jackson
basic parenting skills, but because of their own personality
disorders they were unable to implement such teachings;
expert witnesses testified it was doubtful

that there

would ever be improvement in their parenting roles.
(R.

31-32, 116-118).

The record is replete with evidence of parental
unfitness and the nexus betlveen the parents' unfitness
and the serious personality disorders of their child.
For example, Cyril Heisner testified concerning a home
visit where he observed Carol performing "very inappropriate attention-getting behavior
attention."

to attract ... boys'

Mr. Weisner stated:

I talked very specifically with Marvin-this was the kind of limit setting I was
talking to him about ....
[H)e needed to
deal with this, and I got down to the point
of offering ... suggestions, talk to he7, get
her attention, do soMething, and Harvln,
as he would do time and time again across
these fifteen months v1ould not and agreed
that I have a good idea and probably s?mething like that ought to be done, ~ut lt
seemed like he was paralyzed. He JUSt
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could not act and did not act through the
whole visit to interfere, restrain set a
limit on, in any way modify the be~avior
of Carol.
[As to Ruby] though s!1owing
some very giggly laughy affect herself
again, [she] did not intervene to in anyway modify w!1at was going on and I got
the definite impression she was at that
moment relating to the situation as a
fifteen-year-old.
And of course, we can generalize from
that tremendous concerns here it tells
me and confirms fears I've had for a long
time that the--number one, Marvin, I think
--well, both parents want, I think, certainly
Ruby, to have their children and to do what's
correct by them, but they're not able to.
Marvin was paralyzed in that situation. He
was unable to react even with my very direct
kinds of promptings.
Ruby was so in touch
with the situation, and I suppose experiencing
what Carol was doing vicariously to the extent
that her affect was right down on Carol's
level, and I got the idea that we had two
fifteen-year-olds at the moment, laughing
and giggling and doing those things.
(R. p. 70-71).
Although it is true that termination of parental
rights is an extreme example of state intervention in
family life, the facts of the present case show that the
statutory requirements for such action have been met and
that the welfare of the Jackson children involved herein
requires that they be removed permanently from a home
that cannot contribute to their development in any way.
This Court has developed certain tests or guideL
to determine the legal sufficiency of a termination order.
In the case of In re the Interest of \\linger,

558 P. 2d l)l

(1976), the court adopted with aprroval the test enunciate
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in an Oregon case under an identical termination statute,
to the effect that a termination order must be supported
by a preponderance of the evidence to the effect that (1)
the parent is presently unable to supply physical and
emotional care for the child and that (2) this condition
will probably continue for time enough

to render the

integration of the child into a suitable family improbable.
(Ibid.)

In the case of State in the Interest of Walter B.,

577 P.2d 119

(1978), this court held that to sustain a

termination the characteristics ascribed to the mother
must represent such a substantial departure from the norm
as to constitute a condition seriously detrimental to the
child.

In the case of State in the Interest of E.B.,

578 P.2d 831

(1978), the court stated that as a condition

to termination a parent must be advised of appropriate
remedial action, and that it must be clearly manifested
that the home cannot or will not correct the deficiencies
which exist there.
The ultimate and most important test in applying
the statutory standard must be the interest and welfare of
the child, which concern must outweigh any right or privilege
of the natural parent.
2d 47, 376 P.2d 948

In the case of State v. Dade,

14 Utah

(1962), this court stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Quite beyond and 111ore imoortant than the
rights and privileges of the parents is
the welfare of these children~ and their
prospects for becoming well-adjusted, selfsustaining individuals. This is the consideration of paramount importance."
(376 P. 2d at pg. 949).
In the termination case of In re Interest of Jennings, 432
P.2d at pg. 879 (1967), this court stated:
"While ordinarily the parents have a right
to the custody of their children, the State
also has an interest in the welfare of
children, which is 9aramount thereto."
In the termination case of State in the Interest of A, 514
P.2d at pg. 799

(1973), this court stated:

"While one feels
is deprived of a
not overcome the
courts to act in
child."

deeply for a parent who
child that feeling must
duty placed upon the
the best interest of the

In the termination case of In re Interest of Winger, (Supri
at pg. 1313, 1976), this court stated:
"There is a presumption of great strength,
that it is in the best interests of the child
to be reared by its natural parents. This
presumption is only overcoMe when the trier
of facts is convinced by a preponderance of
the evidence the welfare of the child requir~
termination."
And in the termination case of In re the Interest of S.J~
H.J. and S.J., 576 P.2d 1280 (1978), this court stated:
"It was also fair and reasonable to further
conclude that the rights of the parents were
secondary in importance since they were in
direct conflict with and contrary to the
best interest of the children."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Applying these tests and guidelines in the instant
case results in the following analogy:
The parents are unfit or incompetent by reason
of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the children
because
1.

They are presently unable to supply physical

and emotional care for the children.
2.

This circumstance will probably continue

beyond the time in \vhich these children could otherwise
be integrated into a suitable substitute home.
3.

The conduct and condition of the parents

is a substantial departure from normal parental relationships.
4.

The parents have been advised of their

inadequacies and advised of appropriate remedial action,
but no change in the circumstances has taken place.
5.

The preponderance of the evidence dictates

that it is in the best interests of the children to
terminate the parental relationshin.
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POINT II
CONCERNING PSYCHIA'CRTC ll~lD
S1 tlOLOGICAL E; _, INATl ~S lvr, PR! ERLY
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.
TES'T'IMO~JY
0

Appellants argue t'l.at they had no notice concerni
a hearing prior to the ordering of psychiatric or psycholos.,
examinations.

It is true that Section 78-3a-23, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), provides that there shall be "due noti:
and a hearing set for the specific purpose" when the Court
finds that the parents'

"physical, mental, or emotional

condition may be a factor in causing the neglect,
or deliquency of the child."

depen~m

The facts of this case make

it clear that the parents did have notice of the request
for psychological testing and that they were not denied
a hearing relating thereto.
The State requested psychological examinations
at a hearing on Harch 8, 1977.

The petition bringing

the termination matter before the Court specifically
alleged that the parents' emotional condition was a factor
underlying the request for permanent deprivation of
parental rights.

An objection was made by Jonathan Ki~,

counsel for one of the Jackson children, based on a bel~'
that the parents had alraedy been tested in connection w~
a psychological examination of one of their sons.

(R-4) ·

A final decision reqardin(T the testinq waco oostponed untL
the pre-trial hearing on t1arch 17, 1977, when i:l!JPf'llants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were represented by Patricia Derlichele.

After discussing

the desirability of having any tests already begun completed
for continuity's sake, counsel stated:
"Your Honor, the only thing that I would
request at this point is, if it is not
going to be Doctor Tomb and it's determined
that he can't or won't--doesn't feel
comfortable following through, that I
be able to have some input as to who is
ultimately determined to be the ...
(R.- ll.)

That counsel did have input into the testing process
is shown by State Exhibit #1, psychological evaluation.

The

following appears at page 183 of the record.
" ... Patty DeMichele of Legal Services represents
the parents.
Because permanent rather than
temporary deprivations of parental rights is
in question, Ms. DeMichele expressed the condition
that both parents be seen by two examiners.
Repeating essentially the same test battery with
no reasonable time interval was considered as
invalidating the evaluation process.
Instead,
Ms. DeMichele agreed to another procedure;
William H. Brown, a Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist
was the other examiner.
He conducted the testing
with Mrs. Jackson and the bulk of the post-testing
interview.
He then made his test data available
to this examiner ['-1alcolm L. Liebroder, Ph. D.)
who had also been present during Dr. Brown's
interview of Mrs. Jackson.
The procedure was
essentially reversed for Mr. Jackson.
Each
examiner independently prepared reports of their
evaluation for each of these parents." (Emphasis
added).
Not only were appellants fully represented by
counsel in the selection of an appropriate and fair testing
pr0-'0SS, but there was n~ objection to the adequacy of notice
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-11- OCR, may contain errors.

or to the nature of the hearing at '.vhich the order regard 1,
psychological exams was made.

Further, there was no

objec~.

to the order itself or, as discusscu in Point III of the
Brief of the Guardian Ad Litem, to the testimony of the
two court-appointed examiners, Dr. Liebroder and Dr.
Berens en.

Inasmuch as Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidenc'

requires a timely objection on the record to evidence
claimed to

be

erroneously admitted, appellants may not

now seek a reversal of the judgment based on the testimony
of Dr. Liebroder and Dr. Berensen.
Respondent State of Utah would argue that the
hearing requirements were met where the order for psychoW
cal testing, vital to the determination of the issue be fort
the Court, was nade in a formal hearing setting where the
parents were represented bv com~etent counsel.

Whether

or not the hearing could be described as having been
"set for the specific purpose" would not appear to centro:
the validity of the hearing.

It is clear from the reco~

that the due process rights of appellants were fully
protected.

The parents had notice of the hearings where

psychological examinations were discussed.

They were

represented by counsel at the March 17th hearing where
the State made a specific motion to have such tests perfo:·
(R.

ll.)

Nu '·biection

IVil.S

made to that rntion Lly couns.ol

for appellants.
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Should the court find that there was not
compliance with the specific language of Section 78-3a-23,
U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), the order of the Juvenile

Court based on evidence

ste~~ing

from the psychological

examination should nevertheless by upheld.

Rule 61 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure SU?ports this position.
It states:
Harmless Error.
No error in either the
admission or the exclusion of evidence, and
no error or defect in any ruling or order or
in anything done or admitted by the Court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the Court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The Court at every stage
of the proceeding must disregard any error of
defect in the proceeding which does not effect
the substantial rights of the parties.
In the present case there is amply uncontradicted
evidence as to the unfitness of appellants to fulfill the
parenting role.

Sources of such evidence include observation

of interaction in the home and observation and testing of
the emotionally disturbed children, in addition to psychological tests taken voluntarily by parents who, though unable
to function as parents, have been shown to possess sufficient
intelligence to understand the nature of the oroceedings
in t!1c present case.
In Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 U. 191, 240 P.2d 266
(19'>2), this court held that an error, even if conceded,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was harmless \vhere ample evidence, other than that of a
witness claimed to be disqualified, was sufficient to
support the court's decision.

In the instant case,

although the psychological tests clearly describe the nate:
of appellants' disabilities,

testimony of all the witnesse:

convincingly pointed to their serious parenting failures.
Appellants have not shown that the action of

t~

Juvenile Court was inconsistent with substantial justice
in this matter, nor have they suggested that given a
"hearing set for the specific purpose" of considering
evidence concerning the need for psychological testing of
appellants, there would have been a different result from
that reached by the Juvenile Court.
This Court should likewise reject appellants'
arguMent that the order perManently depriving them of
their children should be vacated because of alleged defec>
in the procedure for obtaining psychological exa'ilinations.

POINT III
THE ORDE~ OF ":'HE JUVE:~liL:S COURT TE:'c'HNATING
PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO ROSE, BUT PERMITTING
CONTINUING CON':'ACT vJITH HER '<ATURAL PAI\ENTS
AS SHE DESIRES, WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE
COURT'S EQUITABLE PO\'.'ET{S AND SHOULD NOT BE
OVERTU!<tlED.

As this court has stated,

"the

1
·
lat i tute
is given hroad and com!ore.1ens1ve

[juvenile] court
i1

,d discrctior.
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determining the custody of the child .... "

(Deveraux v.

Brown, 2 Utah 2d 334, 336, 273 P.2d 185, 196 (1954)).

The

legislature has recognized this principle in enacting
Section 78-3a-39, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), which sets

outs in 19 subsections a variety of dispositions which
may be made by juvenile court order.

Subsection 17 states:

"The court may make any other reasonable orders ~;hich are
for the best interest of the child .... "
The following statement of this court in State
v. Dade,

376 P.2d at paqe 951 (1962)

supports the disposition made by the juvenile court in
the present case:
It is appropriate to observe that this
proceeding, which has such a vi tal and
permanent effect on the lives of those
concerned, is not adversary in the
usual sense, but is an inquiry into the
welfare of the children; and is therefore
equitable in tre highest degree. Due to
this fact and to the somewhat informal
manner in which such proceedings are
conducted,
the Juvenile Court has even
more than the usual advantages in
judging the credibility of the witnesses,
the personalities of the persons involved,
and the correct solution to the problems
confronted. For these reasons, and also
because that court is staffed with judges
and personnel who have special training,
experience and interest in this field,
and who are devoting their exclusive
attention to such matters, it is proper to
allows that court a wide latitude of discretion
as to the judgment arrived at. According~y
it is the well established rule that we Wlll
not disturb the findings and determinations made
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unless they are clearly against the weight of
the evidence, or it is plainly manifest that
the court has abused its discretion.
In the instant case there was much evidence

~c

it would be in the best interest of Rose to remove her
permanently from her parents' home.

Her school teacher

testified that while living at home Rose was usually
dirty, wore old, ill-fitting clothes, was unable to form
relationships with her peers, and was usually depressed,
although she was a bright child who could do good work.
(R.

104-109).

Dr. Claudia

Berense~,

while recognizing

Rose's personality strengths and resiliency, recommended
that Rose not be returned to a home where the parents are
not "able to

~rovide

environment ... "

a nurturing, even minimally

(R. 132).

adequa~

Dr. Berensen recommended

a termination of parental rights but added that she felt
it would be important for Rose to see her natural parents
"when she felt the need."

[R. 133).

Rose, at 8 1/2 years

old, was described as an adoptable, socially skillful
child, whose parents could not care for her.
The judgment of the court in this matter was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence before it.
It is true that it is unusual to preserve the right of
contact with natural parents in a termination order,
but given t:he c_:ourt's equitable povn"r" ancl the rule thJt
the best interest of the child must bt> served, the order
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POIN'i' IV
THE OR::JER TERC1I11JATING APPEL!..ANTS' PAS-ENTAL
RIGHTS AS TO HAROLD AND DOLLIE JACKSON AND
PLACING THE:1 n; CUSTODY OF TH;<; UTAH STATE
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES FOR PLACEHENT
I~l 1\!-l ADOPTIVE HOME \•/AS SUPPORTED BY A
PREPON~E~NCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD
NOT BE l10DIFIED '10 AFFO'.<.D THE APPELLANTS
VISITATION RIGHTS.

Harold and Dollie are young children who have
not lived in the hor:1e of their natural parents for many
nonths.

As set out in Point I, the evidence fully supports

the termination of parental rights with regard to these
children, and the Juvenile Court found from the evidence
that they are adoptable and without strong ties to their
parents.

Counsel for appellants elicited the following

response from Cyril Weisner, a parent therapist with the
Children's Center, v1hen she asked "1'/hat kind of emotional
bonds

[Harold and Dollie] had with their parents?""
This is again, a tough one for r:1e to relat2
to, but my most solid feeling about this is
that these two young children, if they have
a relationshio with these two individuals,
it's alr:1o~t- although again, it's a child to
child thing, that it's a-- they may be
bigger kinds [sic]
It's kind of hard in
those ways to go into the mind of a small child
of course, but I don't think there is a
tremendously strong parent-certainly not in
the areas we would expect at this age, because
there has been little stir:1ulation, Harold and
Dollie both have been allowed to >vithdraw
time and time again and limits have virtually
not been set in any way, so I don't think there's
anythinq there and especially looking at it
frop 1 the stzmdcJoint of what I think would be
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best for. those t\vo children, llurold and Dollie
I'm talk1ng about.
There is nothing there in
the wily of a bond that I would be tremendous~
afraid to disrupt.
The facts of the present case support a terminM
of appellants' parental rights concerning Harold and DolL·
Sue!! termination in the case of these

b-10

children correct

applies to "all the rights and duties, including residual
parental rights and duties, of the ... parents involved."
(Section 73-3a-48(3), U.C . .I\.

(1953, as al:'ended)), and

is clearly within the power of the Juvenile Court to so
order.

(See Point III.)
POIN~

V

THE MINOR CHILDRE~ HAVE A CONSTITUTIO'mLLY
PROTECTED RIGHT TO 'i'HE PHESERVATIO:--J OF
THEIR BEST INTERESTS.
In the case of State in the Interest of A,
supra, this court, after sustaining the termination
of parental rights regarding three minor children

si~ilar

in ages to the minor children involved in the instant

~~

suggested that the children should be placed in a proper
adoptive home " ... where they can feel that they belong
to a family group."

(514 P. 2d at BOO).

It is obvious in the instant case that if the
appellants' parental rights ure perpetuated the minor
children will spend their remuining growinq up years
in foster care, possibly tr,msfcl-rcc to u. succession
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of surrogate foster parents, without any perr.1anent familial
ties.

Many of the courts of this land have held that such

a circumstance is unconstitutional, that

a child has a

"liberty" right to the protection of his best interest,
free from any narental possessory claim.
In the case of In re Roy, 393 !LY.S.2d 515,

(1977)

the Family Court for New York City held that a natural
mother's possessory claim to a 16 year old son who had
lived with foster parents since one year old should be
severed in the best interest of the child.

The court

stated:
"For this court to refuse to consider the
child's best interest because of an adult's
title to him, albeit a biological parent's,
seemingly would be unconstitutaionl.
To preclude a oerson bv virtue of his birth from
a benefit - from~ a measure promoting his
interest - would be an anomaly in constitutional law ....
The minor has an unequivocal
and unquestionable interest in termination
of his~parent's title to him, and therefore
he seemingly has a constitutional right to
freedom from the parental possessory claim."
The integration of a child into a viable family
unit is more important to the child than maintaining a
non-custodial natural parent-child relationship.
case of State v. Blum,

In the

(Or. App. 1970), 463 P.2d 367,

which was cited with approval by this court in the case
of In rc \vinger, supra, the Oregon Appeals Court, under a
dq•ci /at ion statute identical to ours, affin'led an order
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that parental rights of a mentally ill mother could be
terminated upon finding that she was unfit by reason
of a condition seriously detrimental to the child.

The

court stated:
"It is important that the child have
a sense of belonging to a family.
T'·is
is one of the things we look for after we
say that our prime consideration is the best
interests of the child.
It is not in the
best interest of the child to keep hiw
forever in a limbo--a limbo that is
terminated, if at all, when on some
uncertain date his mentally ill mothec
recovers and gives him a normal mother's
care.
For this child it may well be
that at his present age of seven and onehalf years it is already too late to successfully integrate him int~ a family.
If it
is not too late, it is important-to get it
done soon."
(463 P. 2d, p. 370).
The federal courts have placed a name tag

on

this right of a child to the least restrictive familial
relationship.

In the case of Organization of Foster

Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277(1976), certain
foster parents attempted to restrain the New York City
Human Resources Administration from transferring foster
children without affording a constitutionally

appropria~

fair hearing, claiming that both the foster children and
the foster parents enjoyed a familial right of privacy
similar to that recognized in a biological family relat~
ship because of the psychological ties v1hich had

bee:-~
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formed,

which was protected under both the Equal

Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

The Federal District Court agreed with the

foster parents that the pre-removal procedures employed
by the New York agency were consitutionally defective,
recognizing in the process that the minor children had
a constitutionally protected "liberty interest to familial
privacy " ; viz., a consitutional right to the preservation
of the least restrictive familial relationship which can _
not be deprived without due urocess.

The court disagreed

with the intervening natural parent's contention that a
hearing is superfluous when a foster child is to be returned
to its biological parents,holding that if the evidence
discloses that, despite the diligent efforts of the agency,
the biological parent has failed for more than a year to
maintain substantial and continuious contact with a child
in foster care, permanent neglect proceedings may be
instituted and the biological parent's presumptive rights
to custody may be forfeited.
283).

(418 F. Supp. 277 at page

On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the

Supreme Court reversed the District Court on the basis
that the New York pre-removal procedures did meet due
process requirements.
Fami1iEC~,

(1977).

Smith v. Organization of Foster

431 U.S. 816, 87 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14
Limiting its decision to this narrow ground the
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Supreme Court did not affirm head on whether or not a
child has a "liberty interest to familial privacy."
The Supreme Court did recognize, however, that "the
il'lportance of the familial relationship to the individuals
involved stems from the emotional attachments that

deri~

from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
it plays in promoting a way of life through the

ro~

instruct~

of chilcren, as well as from the fact of blood relsionship.
(97 S.Ct. at page 2110)

Further the court recognized

that " ... emotional ties betlveen foster parent and foster
child are in many cases quite close, and undoubtedly in
some as close as those existing in biological families.'
(97 S.Ct., footnote 52 at page 2110).
In the instant case there is no question of

d~

process in regard the termination procedures which have
been followed, nor is there a custody contest involved
between natural and foster parents.

The right of a child

to have a secure and adequate family relationship in whid
he can develop to his fullest potential is, however,
similarly involved.

In

this regard we think the follm1>

language of the Dumpson court is relevant and signigicant:
"The time has long since passed when children
were considered mere chattels of t'le adults
with whol'l they lived.
The foster care system
l tself, initiated ln New York in the latter pac·
of • ;1e nineteenth century, rerrcsented a large
teu forward from the prior practice of
insiitutionalizing children with the poor a~
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feebleminded or boarding them out as

a~prentices or indentur~d servants.

In
any event, it is by now well-settled that
children are 'persons' within the meaning
of ~he Fourteenth Amendment whose rights are
ent1tled to protection against state abridgement. (Authorities omitted)
Foremost among
those rights, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, is the right to be heard before
being 'condemned to suffer grievous loss'".
(Authorities omitted) 418 F. Suoo. at 282
(Emphasis added).
-There seems to be no question that a continued
parental relationship between appellants and the minor
children will be detrimental to the children, even if
non-custodial.

Concern was expressed that Mr. Jackson

would not be a resource but rather a handicap for the
children as demonstrated by the fact that everyone of
his children had severe problems.

(R. 25, L. 18).

Mrs.

Jackson has real difficulty in functioning as an adequate
parent, and is neither a positive nor stimulating resource
for the children.

(R. 32, L. 1).

Even with outside

resources and help it is doubtful that the parents can
be helpful or any kind of a resource for the children.
(R.

37-38).

Mr. Jackson can afford no love and affection

for the children and though Mrs. Jackson cares she can't
do much for them.

(R. 37, L. 10).

There \vas a marked

improvement in the basic skills and performance of the
children after receiving special care outside the
ho!'IC'.

(R.

44, L.

19).

On being returned home from foster
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care, Harold's speech regressed, be

beca~e

isolated,

his drooling increased, his bed wetting resumed, his
toiletting ability regressed and his I.Q. decreased.
(R.

52-53).

While residing at home Dollie was unkempt,

improperly clothed and had a general apathy completely
uncharacteristic for a little girl of 2 years old.
79, L. 29).
(R.

42, L.

(R.

She received no stimulation in the home.
18).

One clinical psychologist testified that Mr.
Jackson actually didn't want the children, didn't even
want his marriage.

(R. 32, L.21).

A psychiatrist testifie.

that Mr. Jackson had only a minimal interest in looking
at the particulars of his children as a parent.
L.

23).

(R. lH,

Mrs. Jackson wants her children with her, but on

the

c~ild-like

(R.

72,

L.

basis of a 15 year old having playmates.
After clinical assistance over a period

3).

of almost a year there was no significant improvement
in the ability of the parents to stimulate or discipline
the children.

(R. 72, L. 4).

A well qualified psychologis'

testified that long term foster care was not the answer
for the family difficulties and in fact would be harmful
and detrinental.

(R.

56, L. 14).

The continuation of a parental relationshio
betwee

apr~cllcnt;" a:1d th<· '., i ldren involved in this ap~e
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will condemn said children to suffer a grievous loss in
relation to their right to a non-limiting familial relationship.

Continuation of foster relationships which effectively

keep these children in limbo and deny them a permanent
family relationship would not be in their best interest.
Termination of parental rights, and setting these children
free for permanent adoptive relationships before it is too
late, would be the lest restrictive alternative regarding
the "liberty"

rights

of these children, and consistent

with the expressed legislative intent of this State.
(Section 78-3a-9(19), U.C.A., 1953, Replacement Volume
9A).
CONCLL'SIO'l
The order of the Juvenile Court to terminate the
parental rights of the appellantF' herein was based on
evidence that appellants, because of severe personality
and emotional disorders, are unable to provide for the
basic developmental needs of their children.

Evidence

further indicated that outside assistance or training
given the parents did not and would not result in any
improvement in their parenting abilities.

Psychiatric

and psychological examination of the parents, carried out
pursuant to court order without objection by appellants,
were properly considered by the court in determining the
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Although the three younger chi ldrcn of appellant,
(Rose, Harold, and Dollie) are all considered adoptable,
expert testimony ners\1adei1 the r0urt that it was in the
best interests of Rose, a child who exhibited unexpected
personality strengths and certain ties to her parents,
to be allowed contacts with her natural parents subsequent
to the termination of the parent-child relationshi9.

Such

a provision in the order of the Juvenile Court is an
acceptable exercise of the board discretionary powers vestin the court in juvenile natters.

The court found that

inasnuch as no emotional bond existed between Harold and
Dollie and their parents, complete termination of parentac
rights was in the best interest of these children.
Recognizing the extreme need of three children
for a hone that can meet their psychological a:1d social
needs and save them from a future as emotionally
deprived and anti-social adults, respondent State of
Utah seeks the affirmance of the order of the Juvenile
Court.
Respectfully Submitted,
R0!3ER'l' B. HA:'JSE:-J
Attorney General
PATRICIA S. ALLRED
FRAil::\LY"l B. >11\T!IESOH
Assistant Attorneys G~neral
Attorneys for Respondent
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